Security and privacy of RFID systems have become very important issues along with their increasing applications. Recently, Jeon and Yoon proposed a new ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocol(RAPLT) using merge and separation operations. Since their protocol uses very lightweight bitwise operations: XOR, merge, and separation operations, it will be suitable for the applications using low-cost RFID tags. However, in wireless communications, it is very important for RFID authentication protocols to resist the relay attacks which are performed by an adversary possessing a proxy reader and a proxy tag. Using the proxy equipment, the adversary simply relays the communication messages between a genuine reader and a genuine tag, and is authenticated by the reader. Since RAPLT is insecure from the relay attacks, in this paper, we propose an ultra-lightweight RFID distance bounding protocol that can resist the relay attacks.
Introduction
RFID systems have become very popular due to their convenience and usefulness to identify objects. They are applied to various applications such as inventory management, supply chain management, access control, smart labels, natural habitat monitoring, etc. RFID systems are consisted of tags, readers, and the reader connected to the back-end server. Each tag has a unique ID and the reader reads the information of the tag and identifies it through wireless channel; however, the channel is vulnerable to the various security attacks. Therefore, it is required to develop RFID authentication protocols that are safe from the security attacks and privacy invasions. However, it is not easy to develop protocols suitable for the low-cost RFID tags. The reason is that low-cost RFID tags have too limited hardware resources to adapt the existing authentication protocols using modern ciphers that require lots of computation costs and storage space. Therefore, recently several ultra-lightweight authentication protocols using lightweight operations have been proposed for the applications of low-cost RFID tags.
In 2006, Peris-Lopez et al. proposed a family of ultra-lightweight authentication protocols for low-cost RFID, LMAP [1] and M2AP [2] , which use bitwise operations, XOR, AND, OR, and modular operation. Since their protocols were very simple, they were suitable for low-lost RFID tags. Unfortunately, their protocols are vulnerable to de-synchronization attack and full disclose attack [3] . In 2007, Chien [4] proposed a new ultra-lightweight authentication protocol, SASI, which supports mutual authentication and tag anonymity. However, Sun et al. [5] showed that SASI cannot resist from the de-synchronization attack. Cao et al. [6] showed that SASI is vulnerable to the de-synchronization attack through the man-in-the-middle attack. Phan [7] used the imbalance of the bitwise OR operation to do the tracking attack for SASI. In 2009, Peris-Lopez et al. [8] proposed another ultra-lightweight authentication protocol called Gossamer. But in 2010, Targa et al. [9] showed that Gossamer is vulnerable to the de-synchronization attack. In 2011, Tian et al. [10] proposed a new ultra-lightweight authentication protocol (RAPP) for low-cost RFID tags. They defined and used permutation operation in their protocol. However, In 2013, Jeon and Yoon [11] pointed out that RAPP is vulnerable to denial of service and de-synchronization attack, and presented a new ultra-lightweight authentication protocol(EURFID) in which merge and separation operations were defined and used. Quite recently, Jeon and Yoon [12] pointed out that EURFID cannot serve correctly in case of tag pseudonyms collision in the reader's database, and they proposed an improved authentication protocol(RAPLT) which resolves the flaw in EURFID.
Since the communications between the reader and the passive tags occur in the air, RFID systems are very vulnerable to security threats such as man-in-the-middle attacks, denial of service attacks, de-synchronization attacks, relay attacks, etc. Relay attack is a kind of man-in-the-middle attack that is performed using a proxy reader and a proxy tag which forward transmitted data An ultra-lightweight RFID distance bounding protocol 2267 between a genuine reader and a genuine tag. It is not easy to prevent the relay attacks by cryptographic protocols that performed on the application layer of an RFID protocol stack. To resist the relay attacks, it is commonly used RFID distance bounding protocols [13] [14] [15] [16] that is tightly integrated into the physical layer of the communication protocol using the round trip time measurement for 1 bit challenge and response between a reader and a tag. In this paper, we propose an ultra-lightweight RFID distance bounding protocol(DRAPLT) that can resist the relay attacks. The proposed DRAPLT protocol is based on RAPLT.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we describe preliminaries and notations for this paper. In section 3, we describe the presented DRAPLT protocol. Then, the security and performance analysis of the proposed protocol are discussed in section 4. Finally, the conclusion is given in section 5.
Proposed DRAPLT protocol
In the proposed protocol, DRAPLT, each tag has a unique identity, secret keys, and old and new pseudonyms of the tag identity as well as RAPLT. The server keeps these values in the back-end database to authenticate the tags.
Notations
The notations used throughout this paper are summarized in Table 1 . 
Mer(A, B, K, C)
Merge operation which merges A and B to C according to K. If the bit of K is 0, then the bit of A moved to C, otherwise the bit of B moved to C.
Sep(C, K, A, B)
Separation operation which demerges C to A and B according to K. If the bit of K is 0, then the bit of C moved to A, otherwise the bit of B moved to C. 
DRAPLT protocol
Like in RAPLT, the main operations of the proposed protocol DRAPLT are the merge operation, Mer() and the separation operation, Sep(). However, unlike in RAPLT, DRAPLT is designed to resist the relay attacks. The relay attack is a kind of man-in-the-middle attack where an adversary impersonates as a legal user by simply relaying the communication messages using a proxy reader and a proxy tag between a genuine reader and a genuine tag as illustrated in Fig. 1 . The RFID reader can read the RFID tag in close proximity. As illustrated in Fig. 1 , the adversary who has the proxy reader and the proxy tag takes his position between the genuine reader and the genuine tag. Even though the genuine tag is located far away from the operation region of the RFID reader, the RFID reader considers to be located in a close proximity by reading the relayed messages sent from the proxy tag of the adversary. Therefore, the adversary can be authenticated successfully by the RFID reader.
Fig. 1 Relay attack in RFID system
To prevent the relay attack, distance bounding protocols are used. Existing distance bounding protocols usually use a challenge and response method. It is measured the round trip time of a bit to determine the distance between the reader and the tag. The reader sends a challenge bit to the tag and starts a timer. After receiving the challenge bit, the tag sends a response bit to the reader. As soon as the response is reached, the reader stops the timer. If each round trip time is lower than the threshold value for multiple trials of challenge and response, it is considered that no relay attack exists, otherwise the attack does exist. The proposed DRAPLT is a security-enhanced protocol of RAPLT, which is safe from the relay attacks by using distance bounding concepts.
In DRAPLT, each tag and the server share the five elements, { , , , 1 , 2 }. They are a unique identity, ID, old and new tag's pseudonym, , , and secret keys, 1 , 2 . 1 and 2 are the left half part and the right half part of the secret key, K, respectively. The K composed of 2l bits, where total counts of 0 and 1 are equal. ERAPLT is composed of three phases: authentication phase, rapid bit exchange phase, and update phase. We described the detail procedure of ERAPLT below and summarized in Fig. 2 .
• Authentication phase
Step 1: The reader initiates a session by sending a "Hello" message to the tag.
Step 2: If the tag received the "Hello" message a second time, it sends IDS as , otherwise it sends IDS as to the reader. • Rapid bit exchange phase
Step 1: Repeat l times (i =1 to l) from Step 2 to Step 4.
Step 2: The reader let the timer start and immediately sends a challenge bit, to the tag. Step 3: Upon receiving , the tag compares with . If ≠ , then the tag stops the protocol run, otherwise it sends a response bit, as .
Step 4: Upon receiving , the reader stops the timer. If ≠ or △ >△ , then the reader stops the protocol run, otherwise go to Step 1.
• Update phase
Step 1: After a successful execution of the rapid bit exchange phase, the reader and the tag update their old and new pseudonyms by performing S = and S = 1 .
In DRAPLT as well as in RAPLT, the tag pseudonym, IDS, is updated after a successful protocol run, but the secret keys, 1 and 2 are never updated for any protocol runs. 
Security Analysis and Performance Evaluation
In this section, we analyzed the security and privacy of the proposed DRAPLT protocol. The basic structure of the proposed protocol is similar to that of RAPLT except that it contains distance bounding protocol property. Therefore, DRAPLT can resist the various attacks which can be prevented in RAPLT, and additionally resist the relay attacks.
• Resistance to Relay Attack
Almost all existing ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocols are vulnerable to the relay attacks, because they do not have the distance bounding concept. However, DRAPLT has an ability to detect the relay attacks by measuring the distance between the reader and the tag by checking round trip time of 1 bit challenge and response. Therefore, DRAPLT can resist the relay attacks.
• Resistance to Brute Force Attack Suppose the length of 1 and 2 stored in the tag is l bits respectively. Then, the K has 2l bits, where the total count of 0 is equal to that of 1. Therefore, the total key space, S, is expressed as in expression (1).
If l is 64, then S will be approximately 2 124 from the expression (1) . If the possible keys are 2 124 , the brute force attack for the secret key will be difficult to succeed. Since the length of random numbers and tag identity is equal to that of partial keys, the brute force attack for them will also be difficult to succeed. Therefore, DRAPLT is safe from the brute force attack if the length of each key of the tag is greater or equal than 64.
• Resistance to replay attack The feasible replay attack will be done with the messages sent by the reader in authentication phase. In the messages, two random numbers, tag's identity, and tag's pseudonyms are diffused by the execution of XOR, Mer(), and Ser() operations. Furthermore, since the random numbers and tag's pseudonym are changed every session, the replay messages cannot be authenticated by the tag. Therefore, DRAPLT is safe from the replay attacks.
• Resistance to de-synchronization attack Suppose the adversary blocks some communication messages. As a result, either the reader or the tag updates the pseudonym of tag ID. If the reader did not update the pseudonym, the reader will send the "Hello" message again and then receives the old pseudonym from the tag. Since the old pseudonym is stored in the back-end database, the established session will be performed successfully. If the tag did not update the pseudonym, the reader will receive the old pseudonym as the response to the first "Hello" message. Since the reader can find the old pseudonym in the database, the established session will be performed successfully as well. Therefore, DRAPLT is safe from the de-synchronization attacks.
• Resistance to disclosure attack In DRAPLT, simple executions of XOR, Mer(), or Sep() operations for the communication messages between the reader and the tag do not disclose any secrets such as secret keys or random numbers. Suppose the adversary modifies for the communication messages to infer some information about the secrets. If the modified communication messages can pass the verifications either the reader side or the tag side, the adversary can acquire some information about secrets. However, as far as we know, there is no trapdoor that can help the attacks. Therefore, DRAPLT is safe from the disclose attacks.
• Tag anonymity and resistance to tracking Each tag does not use its unique identity, but uses its pseudonym that is updated after a successful run of DRAPLT. When updating pseudonym, one of the random numbers will be a new pseudonym. However, there is no way to know the tag identity or to figure out the future tag identity using the exposed random number. Therefore, DRAPLT guarantees the tag anonymity and the tag does not permit its tracking. Therefore, DRAPLT provides tag anonymity and can resist tracking of the tag.
• Collision problem of tag pseudonyms Most of the existing ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocols provide tag anonymity by using tag pseudonyms. However, they have the collision problem of tag pseudonyms in the back-end databases. Since DRAPLT was designed on the basis of RAPLT, it does not have the collision problem like in RAPLT.
Performance Evaluation
The performance of DRAPLT is summarized in Table 2 with some other ultra-lightweight authentication protocols. The target of performance evaluation is only the performance of tags, because we can assume that the reader and the back-end server have powerful hardware and software to run the protocols. The comparison factors are composed of security, computation operation, storage requirement, and communication cost in tag side. In Table 2 , L denotes the length of each item stored in the tags.
As we can see in Table 2 , DRAPLT has resistance for all the attacks listed in Table2. Therefore, we can say that it is the most secure protocol among them. In DRAPLT, the used operations are bitwise operations that are efficient enough to be performed in low-cost tags. Communication costs and storage space of DRAPLT are slightly not better than those of the others. However, the relay attacks are very critical in RFID system that uses contactless tags. Generally, the most important factor evaluating RFID authentication protocols is security. Therefore, we can say that DRAPLT is the most secure ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocol among the others listed in Table 2 .
Conclusions
The relay attacks are very critical in the applications of RFID system that uses contactless tags. In this paper, we proposed an ultra-lightweight RFID distance bounding protocol, DRAPLT which can resist the relay attacks. The proposed protocol was made on the basis of the protocol, RAPLT. Since low-cost RFID tags have very limited hardware resources, DRAPLT as well as RAPLT uses very lightweight bitwise operations such as XOR, Mer(), and Sep() operations to cope with the restrictions. Through the security and performance analysis, we showed that the proposed protocol, DRAPLT is secure enough from the various security and privacy attacks. Therefore, it will be a good solution for the applications using low-cost RFID tags. 
